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A THEORY OF STRUCTURAL MODEL VALIDITY IN 
SIMULATION 
Abstract 
During the last decennia, the practice of simulation has  become increasingly popular among many system 
analysts, model builders and general scientists for the purpose of  studying complex systems that surpass the 
operability of analytical solution techniques. As a consequence of  the pragmatic orientation of  simulation, a 
vital stage for a successful application is the issue of validating a constructed simulation model. Employing 
the model as an effective instrument for assessing the benefit of structural changes or for predicting future 
observations makes validation an  essential part of any  productive simulation study. The diversity of the 
employment field of simulation however brings about that there exists an irrefutable level of ambiguity 
concerning the principal subject of this  validation process.  Further, the  literature has  come  up with  a 
plethora of ad hoc validation techniques that have mostly been inherited from standard statistical analysis. 
It lies  within the aim  of this paper to  reflect on the issue of validation  in simulation and to present the 
reader with a topological parallelism of  the classical philosophical polarity of  objectivism versus relativism. 
First, we will position validation in relation to verification and accreditation and elaborate on the prime 
actors in validation, i.e. a conceptual model, a formal model and behaviour. Next, we will formally derive a 
topological interpretation of structural validation for both objectivists and relativists. As will be seen, recent 
advances in the domain of fuzzy topology allow for a valuable metaphor of a relativistic attitude towards 
modelling and structural validation. Finally, we will discuss several general types of modelling errors that 
may occur and examine their repercussion on the natural topological spaces of objectivists and relativists. 
We end this  paper with a formal,  topological oriented  definition of structural model validity for  both 
objectivists and relativists. The  paper is  concluded with summarising the most important findings  and 
giving a direction for future research. 
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1.  Introduction 
Evaluating the truthfulness and the amount of realism of a simulation model soon turns out to 
be one of the most cumbersome tasks in the life cycle of a simulation study. Building reliable and 
credible  simulation  models  is  however  a  vital  prerequisite  for  a  successful  application  of 
simulation to any kind of managerial problem situation. Due to the complexity of reality and the 
accompanying difficulties that arise when modelling real systems, building accurate simulation 
models is rather a matter of art [Tocher 1963] instead of applying an outlined, straightforward set 
of methodological rules. In addition, the pragmatic orientation of simulation brings about that a 
majority of work on  validation that has been published is  based on case  studies and personal 
experiences in simulating grand, complicated real world systems [for a list of recent case studies, 
see  Kleijnen  1995].  Also,  since  simulation  is  definitely  one  of the  most  interdisciplinary 
methodologies, the collection of publications on validity of real  life simulation models is spread 
out over a  spectrum  of fields,  ranging from  military  simulations,  applications  in  production 
facilities,  power  plant  simulation,  simulation  in  chemistry,  biology  and  physics,  aircraft 
simulation,  analysis  of high  speed  communication networks,  studies  of economic  systems, 
artificial intelligence simulation, general system dynamics and so on. The diversity of simulation 
applications has  made that a solid, regulated and objective theory on model  validation is  still 
lacking. Also, since simulation brings together a group of people with distinct backgrounds and 
differing goals  of applying simulation,  inevitably,  different interpretations  of the  concept of 
validation and the process validation should actually be comprised of exist. As a consequence, the 
level of divergence in validity interpretations makes that a debate on validation is echoed along 
the foundations  of many epistemological schools  [Kleindorfer 1998, Dery  1993, Barlas  1990]. 
Although comprehensive, theoretical reflections on the issue of model validity in simulation are 
certainly not absent in the literature [Balci 1998a, Kelton 1991, Banks  1984, Zeigler 1976], the 
model builder will feel  he  is  rather overwhelmed by  a multitude of ad hoc validation methods, 
often greatly inspired on classic statistical theory  [Kleijnen 1998, Martens  1998, Barlas  1989, 
Balci  1984, Fishman 1967]. In addition,  little of those practical validation techniques empower 
him with a formal  instrument to express a degree of validity or an amount of model accuracy 
instead of the usual binary like validity assessment. As  a matter of fact, many of the published" 
statistical validation techniques approach the phenomenon of validation by  means of a test in a 
rather pass/fail fashion.  Models that fail to pass the test are labelled as  invalid, models that pass 
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are accepted! but there is no indication at all of the proportion of their (in)validity.2 In search of a 
way  out of this  dilemma, we feel  it would be appropriate, not to  approach the issue of model 
validity from a binary, statistical point of view, but to come up with a formalism that allows to 
express the accuracy of a model on a scale of model validity.  Since in practice, model validity is 
in fact highly context dependent, the objective uniqueness of such a scale is  not guaranteed. In 
that respect, it might be worthwhile to investigate how the relative aspect of model validity could 
be blended with a technique that allows for a vague, imprecise, fuzzy and relative statement on 
model validity. It lies within the  aim  of this paper to reflect on this confrontation between an 
objective, binary and a relative, fuzzy  approach to the issue of validation.  We  will demonstrate 
that the binary-fuzzy polarity resembles the  classical philosophical duality of foundationalism 
versus anti-foundationalism. Further, irrespective of ones philosophical beliefs, we will formulate 
the act of validation as  a measurement activity following a topological  and  platonic view of 
reality.  As  will  be  seen,  insights  of both  classical  and  fuzzy  topology  allow  for  a  useful 
mathematical counterpart of epistemological groundwork. In that respect, model validity becomes 
a distance that is estimated using a natural metric, representing ones proper philosophical beliefs. 
The paper is  organised as  follows.  In an  initial section,  we will  discuss  different notions of 
model validity and relate them to a general philosophy of science. Further, we will elaborate on 
the classical philosophical duality of objectivism versus  relativism in the context of modelling 
and validation.  Also,  we  will  introduce the principal players  in the  act of validation,  i.e.  the 
conceptual  or structural model,  the formal  model  and  the  model's behaviour.  The following 
paragraph then elaborates on a topological approach to  structural model validation. Through a 
sequence  of postulates,  we  will  introduce  a  general topological  interpretation of conceptual 
modelling and approach the issue of validation from a metric, distance-oriented avenue. After a 
derivation  of the  conceptual  topologies  that  represent  both  a  foundational  and  an  anti-
foundational attitude towards structural validation, we will address ourselves to a study of general 
modelling errors and an analysis of their repercussion on both conceptual model  and universe. 
Finally,  we  end our monograph by a formal  definition of structural model  validity within the 
context of our metric, topological approach to validation. The paper is concluded by summarising 
I Notice that models that pass may be accepted but their validity can never be proven. 
2 As a result, we feel there is a highly uncomfortable level of  ambiguity surrounding the application of  statistical tests for validating a 
model. On the one hand, one accepts in general modelling theory that any model will contain at least some errors while on the other 
hand it is just the absence of errors that is formulated as the hypothesis to be verified. Consequently, a verdict on model validity using 
a statistical instrument becomes a matter of sample size. If  only enough samples are found, the difference between reality and model, 
no matter its magnitude, will be brought to light. We feel that overall this is  a dangerous attitude towards validation since, for the 
particular test applied, the sensitivity of  invalidity detection towards sample size is usually unknown in advance. 
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the most important research findings  and giving a direction for  a collection of future  research 
activities. 
2.  Validation, its kinds and their relation to the philosophy of science 
Reflecting  on  the  issue  of validation,  an  early  dilemma  to  overcome  yet  is  no  doubt  an 
elucidation of what the term validation actually stands for.  Put differently, what is the meaning of 
a phrase that goes like  "This particular model is a valid model of  that phenomenon in reality"? 
Searching for a passage out of this predicament, it seems inescapable to have a look at the major 
terms that comprise this phrase, i.e. a model, a phenomenon in reality and the issue of being valid. 
Although only a complete understanding of reality  can  give  rise to  an  impeccable theory of 
validity, it would be far to ambitious in view of the continual epistemological debate that is held 
among modem scientists to  work out an entire  philosophy of existence. However,  in  order to 
justify any  theory  of model  validity  that  is  proposed,  it  is  vital  to  clear up  any  confusion 
surrounding the partaking subjects in the act of validation. In the next paragraph, we will discuss 
therefore the  classical philosophical duality  of objectivism versus  relativism that has  become 
almost a standard topic in  any  debate on validation. Next,  we  will arrive at different kinds  of 
validation and discuss their relation to nearby concepts as there are verification and accreditation. 
Inspired by  the  philosophical  reflections  on  validation,  we  will  end this  paragraph with an 
elaboration on different kinds of  models and discuss their role in both verification and validation. 
2.1.  A polarity of  validation roots 
Throughout the literature on simulation,  it is  found  that many  researchers exhibit a level of 
dissimilarity concerning the term validation and hence of the focus and the essential objectives of 
the associated validation process. Not only there exists a level of ambiguity on what the process 
of validation should actually focus on, some researchers utter also some amount of confusion with 
closely related concepts as  there are verification and accreditation. It will come as  no  surprise 
that a reflection on validation of simulation models is closely related to the theory of  verifying the 
veracity of an hypothesis, a statement or a general conjecture. As a matter of fact,  depending on 
ones  philosophical  beliefs,  some  will  approach  the  matter of validation on a pure  rational 
(rationalism) or empirical (empiricism) basis, while others may  interpret validation in general 
terms of model usefulness (instrumentalism), the ability to survive (falsificationism) or its social 
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acceptance  (Kuhnianism).  In accordance  with recent publications  on  validation  [Kleindorfer 
1998, Barlas  1996], we  will adhere to the notion of a philosophical polarity  ranging from  an 
attitude of pure objectivism or foundationalism to  a position of strong anti-foundationalism or 
relativism.  In an objectivistic approach, models  are  either true or  false.  For a rationalist, the 
truthfulness or falsehood of such a model  is  revealed through a process of logical deductions, 
unsuitable for empirical verification. For an empiricist, no assumptions or postulates are accepted 
that cannot be fully verified using a solid, empirical scientific procedure [see also Naylor 1967]. 
Or,  as  is  stated by  Landry et al.  [Landry  1983],  where a rationalist concentrates on syntactical 
aspects and logic of a model, an empiricist will focus more on semantical aspects and facts. At the 
heart of this foundationalist approach, that embraces both rationalists and empiricists, lies the 
recognition of a basis or foundation in which the validity of any model  is brought to light. In a 
way,  rationalists  share the conviction that the  intellect or "ratio"  is  the  ultimate  source  for 
knowledge  in their  quest  to  this  foundation.  Empiricists  on  the  other  hand  claim  it  is  by 
observations of facts and the studying of real phenomena that the basis of truth can be revealed. 
In any case, in this objective context, validation of a simulation model is  defined as the process 
during which the  truthfulness  and  the  accuracy  of a  model  are  confirmed  in  regard to the 
foundation. Notice that the final  outcome of such an objective validity study  is  always binary: 
there is no "truth" at the partial confirmation of a theory. Models are either fully correct or fully 
wrong; no state of partial validity exists.  Where rationalists and empiricists will differ in their 
conviction of  the archetypal search method in their global quest of the foundation, they will agree 
on the objective outcome of a verdict on the truth-value of a theory in regard to the foundation. It 
requires little argument to recognise that this binary and objective approach to model validation 
can count on only little adherence in practical situations. As  a result of an impracticable sphere 
surrounding  a  binary  verdict on  model  validity,  many  researchers  will  follow  a relativistic 
pathway  in  assessing  a  model's  validity.  At the  heart  of this  anti-foundationalism  lies  the 
agreement that models may be more or less valid representations of some phenomenon in reality, 
partially depending on the particular world view of the model stakeholders and the goal of the 
modelling study itself.  Since everyone has  its own worldview and image of reality, there is  no 
consensus on the identity (and even the existence) of an objective foundation. Further, the search 
for this foundation is  in fact a needless contemplation of episteme since validity of a theory is 
decided upon using a relative basis that represents the idiosyncrasy of the particular validation 
circumstances.  The  concept of absolute  validity  that symbolises  a  foundational  attitude  is 
henceforth translated to a matter of practical value, model acceptance and model robustness. For 
an instrumentalist, and a positive economist in particular [Friedman 1953], validity equals then 
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the ability to predict future or historical observations using the model. The model is employed as 
a forecasting instrument of some behaviour in reality that is  of particular interest. The model's 
capability  of reproducing this  behaviour or extrapolating it  towards  the future  makes  up  its 
usefulness and defines its validity. On the other hand, addressing the issue of validation through 
the  notion  of model acceptance  brings  us  in  contact with  a model's  credibility and  relates 
validation to  accreditation (establishing credibility amongst a model's stakeholders). In  light of 
Kuhn's theory of evolving paradigms [Kuhn  1970], validation is  a process with both social and 
historical  dimensions  where  a  model's  validity  is  judged upon  based  on  an  explicit set  of 
methodological rules that are  considered being the projection of a paradigm  in evolution on a 
geometry  of acceptance. Interpreting validation as  accreditation brings  validation from  a pure 
scientific occupancy to a matter of managerial interest. A model is valid if its stakeholders have 
accepted it. Finally, approaching the matter of validity in terms of model robustness associates 
validation with the ability to  survive a collection of tests, intended to  falsify  a conjecture or a 
theory [Popper 1959]. In summary, where rationalism and empiricism form the comer stones of 
the foundationalist's approach to  validation,  instrumentalism, falsificationism  and Kuhnianism 
constitute the pillars of an anti-foundationalist's view. It comes as no surprise that this polarity of 
objectivism versus relativism has an enormous impact on the interpretation of validation and an 
assessment of  model validity in general. 
2.2.  Structural validity, behavioural validity and their interrelation 
Passing  the  paragraph on  a  polarity  of validation  roots,  it  has  become  clear  that  ones 
philosophical convictions play  a central role in ones  attitude towards validation. In search of a 
definition of  validation in the context of simulation, let us have a look at a recent, widely accepted 
book on simulation theory  [Kelton 1991].  According to Kelton et aI.,  validation is  defined as 
being primarily related to  the conceptual model underlying a simulation study. More  specific, 
validation is  the process of verifying the truthfulness of the conceptual model. This conceptual 
model, according to the book, is further described as the collection of assumptions that are made 
during the simulation study. Notice that, unfortunately, the concept of a conceptual model is not 
unanimously defined in the literature. In light of this paper, we will follow the interpretation of a 
conceptual model as  being a mental image of reality  [Landry  1983]  and state that a conceptual 
model embraces  both objects and their description as well as  causal relationships among these 
objects. It is believed that in major parts of  the simulation literature [Banks 1998, Oral 1993], this 
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description of a conceptual model  is  the  most widely  accepted  and  commonly  used.  In that 
respect,  a  conceptual model  remains  an  abstract,  intangible reflection  of reality  on a mental 
geometry that is articulated through usage of  an object-relation paradigm. 
Definition 1:  (A conceptual model) 
A conceptual model of  a phenomenon in reality is an abstract, mental reflection of  the participating 
objects, their description and the driving causal interrelationships. 
Notice that the definition of validation,  being concerned about the conceptual model,  does not 
exclude validation from  being active at another level  of interest.  Depending on  the particular 
modelling scenario,  it may very well not be  the  conceptual model one  is  interested in,  but the 
behaviour that can be noticed when observing the model in action. As  a result, validation shifts 
from the domain of conceptual models to the universe of conceptual behaviour, observations or 
stochastic  processes.  In  accordance  with  the  area  of interest,  the  literature  has  clearly 
distinguished between conceptual validity on one hand and operational validity on the other hand 
[see  for  example Balci  1998b].  In parallel to the  terminology of conceptual and  operational 
validity, one often applies the terms structural and  behavioural validity.  Structural validity is 
generally defined as the amount of accuracy of  the structure of a model, i.e. the correctness of the 
network of entities  and  their  causal  relations.  Behavioural  validity  is  concerned  about  the 
agreement of real and simulated (stochastic) processes of interest. Although a level of discussion 
may arise concerning the parallelism of these terms, we will however further consider conceptual 
and operational validity as synonyms for respectively structural and behavioural validity. 
As  a natural consequence of the distinction between structure and behaviour, one of the early 
questions that poses it is whether structural validity automatically induces behavioural validity. In 
other words, does the validity of a model from a conceptual point of view automatically imply its 
validity in every operational context? Looking ahead on a formal reflection on conceptual models 
that is about to come, the answer to this question turns out be yes. Structural conceptual validity 
undoubtingly enforces a validity of behaviour. The reason for this being the conceptual model the 
ultimate source for  any behaviour that might be observed in reality. Since no behaviour may be 
observed  that  is  not  accountable  for  in  the  conceptual  model,  structural  accuracy  implies 
behavioural accuracy. But what about the inverse proposition? Does behavioural validity imply 
structural validity? Let us first define the working object of behavioural validation, i.e. behaviour 
as follows: 
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Definition 2:  (Behaviour) 
Behaviour oj  a conceptual model is the collection oj  all possible observations that can be made, 
either directly or indirectly from observing the model. 
Notice that behaviour consists of all immediate and combined observations3.  To what extent is a 
model capable of reproducing behaviour as  it may  be observed in reality? At this moment, it is 
imperative  to  make  a  distinction  between  a  deterministic  and  a  stochastic  model.  For  a 
deterministic approach to reality, there is  only one  possible behaviour. Reproducing behaviour 
equals in that case the creation of a perfect replica of the behaviour as  it occurred in reality. As 
expected,  a  stochastic  approach  induces  a  collection  of behaviours  equipped  with  some 
probability function. For a deterministic model, operational validity implies an exact imitation of 
behaviour in reality.4  Where deterministic behaviour validity could be rephrased as  a point-by-
point validity, this is  certainly not true for stochastic validity. For a stochastic model,  it matters 
that the model's behaviour obeys the same probability law as its true equivalent. Returning to the 
starting point of our discussion, whether behaviour validity implies structural validity, the answer 
to this question is no for both deterministic and stochastic models. To see why, let us have a look 
at the following example. 
Example 1: Structural versus behavioural validity 
Consider the following fictive portrayal of a phenomenon in reality. The phenomenon consists of  a machine (M) 
and a single queue (Q).  The machine operates at a constant speed of one entity per minute. Entities arrive at the 
machine at a constant interarrival time of half a minute. At the very moment that the queue contains more than five 
elements, the service rate of the machine is quadrupled until the queue is completely empty'. A causal relationship 
exists thus between queue length and machine speed. A collection of interesting behaviour from this system might 
be the speed of  the machine (Moo)'  the length of the queue (Q,), the sequence of waiting times and service times as 
entities leave (Ero(ll,EY), ... and Ea(I),Ea(21, ... ), the sequence of inter  arrival times (QY),Q,(21. ... ), etc  .... Now,  suppose 
that a system analyst is  asked to  study the phenomenon and to come up with a conceptual model. Let us suppose 
that after some time he comes up with a model that is in no way different from the true model of  the phenomenon, 
except in one:  based on the deterministic behaviour of the phenomenon, he has concluded that the machine is 
programmed to increase its service rate during some repetitive amount of time. In essence, in accordance with his 
3  In a queuing environment, an  immediate observation might be the sequence of  waiting times of  customers as they leave the system. 
Combined  observations  are  created  applying  some  mathematical  formula  to  immediate  observations.  Averages,  variances, 
distributions, ratios, etc ... are all examples of  combined observations. 
4 Notice that the technique of  trace-driven simulation is a typical example of removing the stochastic element in a model in order to 
approach the validation problem from a deterministic point ofview. 
S At that moment, it is assumed the service rate resumes its nonnal value. 
Information Systems Group  8 A Theory oJStructural Model Validity in Simulation 
J.  Martens et al. 
perceptions, the causal influence from  queue length to  service rate has shifted towards time.  So conceptually (or 
structurally) his model is wrong. But what about the model's behaviour? Careful examination of the deterministic 
identity of the phenomenon reveals both conceptual models induce exactly the same behaviour. From a behavioural 
point of view, they are indistinguishable. Hence, for deterministic models behaviour validity does not necessarily 
imply structural validity. 
Let us  now  introduce a level of non-determinism in  the  model.  Suppose the  arrivals  follow  a prespecified 
probability distribution (say exponential with mean half a minute).  After making the  necessary changes to the 
system, the analyst is  once again invited to observe the phenomenon and to  construct a conceptual model. After a 
thorough investigation, he claims we altered the deterministic interarrival process and changed it to exponential. In 
asking  whether the  relation  of time  on  service  rate  is  still  valid,  he  comes  up  with  the  statement that the 
quadruplement of the machine's speed  is  now  also  exponentially  distributed.  Once  again,  conceptually,  his 
perceptions are wrong and contain a level non-realism. If one were now able of making several realisations of both 
the analyst's model and the phenomenon in reality, then the stochastic features of the proposed model would in no 
way be distinguishable from reality. Hence, stochastic behaviour validity does not automatically invoke conceptual 
validity. 
2.3.  Validation versus verification 
So  far  we agreed that, from  a theoretical perspective, the  conceptual model  or its  behaviour 
represents the primary subject of validation. But what about a practical validation scenario? Is  it 
s-till the abstract, conceptual model and its behaviour that constitutes the subject of validation? In 
an attempt to answer this question,  we get to the issue of verification. Verification is  generally 
concerned with the amount of distortion that occurred  when translating a conceptual model 
towards a formal representation. We use the termformal model for any concrete representation of 
a conceptual state of mind in a language of choice [Oral 1993]. In that respect, the formal model 
can  be  a  set  of differential  equations  for  the  natural  physicist,  an  object  oriented  system 
specification for the computer scientist or a collection of macro-economic  equations  for  the 
economist. 
Definition 3:  (A Jormal model) 
A Jormal model oj a phenomenon  in  reality  is  the  concrete projection oj a  corresponding 
conceptual model on a language oj  choice. 
Hence, one could claim that where  validation addresses the  issue of building the right model, 
verification focuses  on building the  model right  [Balci  1998b]. Notice that,  besides the terms 
formal and conceptual model, one uses sometimes the terminology of a computerised model. A 
computerised (or computer) model is in fact nothing else than the concrete implementation of a 
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fonnal model on a digital computer. Taking a look again at the book of Kelton et a!.,  verification 
is  the process of detennining whether a simulation computer program perfonns  as  intended. 
Verification is thus concerned about both the translation from a conceptual model into a fonnal 
representation (formal model verification) as  well as the implementation of a formal model on a 
computer (computer model verification). Where validation is inspired by a philosophy of science, 
verification is  instructed by the principles of the  modelling framework applied.  A collection of 
guidelines,  programming  principles,  testing  and  debugging  techniques,  development 
recommendations, etc.  make up a standard guide of computer model verification [Balci  1998a]. 
Computer model  verification is  in that way  a matter of software testing and  related to good 
programming practice and software engineering. Verification of the fonnal model is a matter of 
finding  out whether in  the  articulation of a conceptual model,  there has  occurred a level  of 
erroneous projection of conceptual beliefs on the chosen fonnalism. 
In  discussing the  relation between verification and  validation,  it  is  often emphasised [Balci 
1998a]  that both processes should be executed along the  continuum of a simulation study.  Not 
only  should they be jointly active  in the development phase of a model,  they  should also  be 
carried out during the entire time span the model is used in practice. This principle of carrying out 
V  &V  (verification  and  validation)  along the  life  cycle  of a model,  albeit  it  is  undoubtedly 
valuable in practice [Sargent 1998], is however unattainable in a fonnal reflection on validation. 
As  a matter of fact,  following the  above definitions  of validation and  verification,  it seems 
imperative to regard the conceptual  model  or  its  behaviour as  the  official working object of 
validation and  to  use  the  fonnal  model or the  computer model  as  the object of interest for 
verification. However, the inherent,  intangible identity of the conceptual model makes  it very 
unsuitable for any validation study in practice. As  a matter of fact,  any validation study will be 
working with the formal  or the computer model  and the  behaviour that is  generated by these 
models. This  sentiment of the  fonnal model being the  practical subject of validation makes  it 
highly unwanted of carrying out verification and validation in an intertwined fashion.  Therefore, 
in the remainder of this writing, we will assume a model has been completely verified before it 
undergoes a  verdict on  validity.  In  other words,  we  will  assume  that the  formal  model  is  a 
faultless projection of ones conceptual convictions. In that respect, an assessment about structural 
(conceptual) and operational (behavioural) model  validity can be carried out using the fonnal 
model  without a confrontation with  any  level  of an  imperfect projection of ones  conceptual 
convictions. 
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In an attempt to compose a visual overview of the terms that were introduced in this paragraph, 




Figure 1: Validation, verification and accreditation in relation to different kinds of models 
As can be read from the figure, validation involves a comparison with reality of either the model 
or its  behaviour on a conceptual, formal or computerised level.  Although from  a pure scientific 
point of view, validation is defined on the conceptual level, it was yet briefly mentioned that for 
practical  purposes  it  is  the  formal  or the  computerised model  that makes  up  the  subject of 
validation. Whether one investigates then a model's structure or its behaviour is in fact a matter of 
the goal of  the simulation study. Naturally, models that ought to be used as forecasting tools need 
to undergo a profound behaviour validation study in advance of an implementation. On the other 
hand, models that are expected to give insight in a system's structure, perhaps in the context of a 
reengineering  study,  demand for  a structural  validation approach.  In any  case,  validation in 
contrast with verification is  a relation that involves  reality.  As  can be seen from  the  figure, 
verification questions the correspondence of a system's conceptual,  formal  and computerised 
model. Verification is an answer to the question whether the model, as it has been built, conforms 
to original intentions. Do both the formal and the computer model give an adequate representation 
of our conceptual beliefs? Finally, the  models  that have  been developed,  together with their 
behaviour, need to receive a "green light" from the model's stakeholders before they can be fully 
operationalised. It is  this  process  of building confidence in  the  simulation model  as  well  as 
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marking its value and its competitive advantage for practical decision making that constitutes the 
act of  accreditation. 
3.  A topological view on modelling 
In view of the popularity of a relativistic approach to modelling and validation, an elaboration 
on the  formal  aspects  of both  objective  and  relative  model  validity  seems  appealing.  This 
paragraph is intended to represent the reader with a topological approach to structural modelling. 
In order to address structural validity through a topological perspective, it is however imperative 
we make an initial revisit to the primary players in validation, i.e. a conceptual and formal model 
of a phenomenon in reality.  Since in revisiting these concepts we are ourselves bounded by  our 
own imperfect impressions of reality, we will introduce them in a manner of  postulates their proof 
remains an open debate on physical truth. Because of the particular difficulties that arise when 
introducing the notion of time in validation, we will treat time effects on conceptual models in a 
separate paragraph. 
3.1.  Fundamental postUlates on conceptual models, phenomena and systems 
In an  earlier paragraph, we  gave yet an  informal definition of a conceptual model  being a 
mental  image of a phenomenon in reality.  Also,  we  stated a conceptual  model  is  in fact  an 
intellectual collection of tangible elements or objects and driving causal interrelationships. Let us 
now formalise this notion of a conceptual model in a postulate and position a conceptual model of 
reality in a so-called conceptual universe: 
Postulate 1: A  conceptual model (;) of  reality resides in a conceptual universe (3) that is 
raised by a finite number of  elements ({E;}) and interrelationships ({PJ). 6 
In studying the collection of all real world phenomena (in studying complete reality), we will 
assume that at a particular moment in  time, from  a conceptual point of view, reality can be 
6  We will apply the convention of using upper case symbols for  identifying a space (S,E,P,r,etc  ... ) and lower case symbols for 
representing a member of  that space (i;,E,p,Y,etc ... ). 
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described by  a collection of tangible elements or objects  {E;}  and  causal interrelationships or 
dependencies  {Pj}. A conceptual model  of reality  (~) is  then in fact nothing else than a fine 
description of each of those reality components7• Notice that, from a topological standpoint, this 
collection of objects and relations induces a space that we shall refer to as the conceptual universe 
(3).  As  a  matter  of fact,  the  conceptual  universe  is  the  collection  of all  possible  reality 
descriptions using the same template of objects and relations. Examining the space of conceptual 
models at a particular moment in time is  in  essence inspecting a collection of possible reality 
realisations. Formally we write the space that is constructed by the set of  reality components as: 
A conceptual model of reality can be designated by means of a point in this conceptual universe, 
describing all residing objects and relations. As a matter of fact,  since the conceptual universe is 
assumed to be a finite product space, the conceptual model can be written as a finite (l+m)-tuple 
in this space: 
We  will refer to  the  co-ordinates  ~E  and  ~p  as  the  projection (P  .... )  of ~ on the respective 
,  J 
universes ~  and Pj- We define this projection function (P  .... ) of  conceptual models  ~ as: 
(3) 
Notice that spatial displacements of a conceptual model towards nearby locations are in fact fine 
alterations  of functional  dependencies  or  object descriptions  within a  universe  that remains 
essentially unchanged. Hence, a particular conceptual universe allows for a collection of alternate 
portrayals of  reality components using the same template of  elements and relations. 
7 We will use the tenn reality components to indicate both objects and relations. 
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Having introduced a conceptual model of all real world phenomena as  a point in a conceptual 
universe, which is  constructed by  elements and relations,  an  interesting matter that poses itself 
considers the uniqueness of the conceptual universe 3. In other words, in thinking of models of 
the world,  should we  confine our analysis to  a single  conceptual  universe 3  and  search for 
conceptual models that are elements of the latter? Since 3  is nothing else than a product space of 
elements and relations, it is  likely that in search of a conceptual model of reality, a multitude of 
universes will be passed. Hence, our second postulate: 
Postulate 2: A  conceptual universe (B),  representing a product space of  reality, resides in a 
space of  conceptual universes (n), that is defined as the universe of  all product spaces of 
elements and relations. 
In the context of a collective study of reality, we might expect a collection of  conceptual models 
would be  constructed that reside in a collection of different conceptual universes. If, in defining 
reality, we assume it are objects {Ei}  and relations {Pj} that constitute the building blocks of our 
environment, every finite product of these components makes up a candidate conceptual universe 
of  reality. Let us denote the universe of  all product spaces of  elements and relations as n: 
n ==  { x {EiEI,PjEJ }  ,all I and J}  I,J 
(4) 
Notice that the elements of n are  in fact nothing else than conceptual spaces. Considering the 
power set of n, pen), we have the collection of all subsets of conceptual spaces. Notice that an 
element of pen) coincides  in fact  with  a  particular set of intellectual  frameworks  (a set of 
conceptual universes) to approach reality.  Since the set of all subsets of the collection of reality 
frameworks  (n)  could  be  thought  of as  a  set  of all  possible  pathways  to  express  the 
conglomeration of reality,  the power set of n  (p(n)) constitutes of all  possible  intellectual 
windows on reality. An intellectual window on reality  is  thus nothing else than a grouping of 
intellectual frameworks or conceptual spaces through which a declaration of reality is looked for. 
In that respect,  at a particular moment in  time,  an  intellectual  window  represents  a state  of 
conceptual world views (a state of conceptual spaces). In an objective atmosphere, it is through 
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the act of research and science that the intellectual window may be steered towards the disclosure 
of  the foundation. 
In light of a set of elements and relations that construct a conceptual space of reality, it is only 
natural to ask oneself how each of these reality  components can be  accurately described.  Put 
differently: what are the necessary ingredients to make up a description of a particular element or 
relationship? A third postulate defines the description of  reality components: 
Postulate 3: Every element (EJ and relationship (P) can be defined using afinite number of 
state variables. 
It is  assumed in this postulate that there exists a class of attributes to fine describe each reality 
component. We shall call these attributes description variables for  elements and a mathematical 
specification for causal interrelationships.  Description variables and  mathematical expressions 
specify reality elements and relations, which in tum construct a product space that allows for a 
topological approach to reality and conceptual modelling. In accordance with the terminology that 
was  yet introduced by  Zeigler [Zeigler  1976],  we  will  group  these  description variables  and 
functional  expressions in  a collection that we  shall refer to  as  state variables. Notice that the 
collection of state variables is defined as the collection of variables that, if having full knowledge 
about their values, enables us to derive any other output variable from reality. In other words, a 
full description of  reality cannot be done without knowledge of  the state variables. Put differently, 
the collection of state variables  forms  the most  compact, indispensable  and complete set of 
variables to define reality.s Taking a closer look at the description of a state variable, it turns out 
that a causal relationship has  a maximum of only  one state variable.  As  a matter of fact,  the 
expression representing the causal influence forms the only possible state variable of the relation. 
Since in light of our further discussion, an adequate notion of the concept of a state variable is 
necessary, let us first clarify any left confusion on the difference between a state variable and an 
output variable. 
8 Output variables are thus some complex function of state variables while state variables themselves cannot be derived from output 
variables. 
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Example 2: State variables and output variables 
Consider the  following phenomenon that occurs in  reality.  In  a  computemetwork, a relation  (RI) has  been 
defined that causes the activation of a second server (S2) as soon as network traffic exceeds the level of 10MB per 
second. As long as the total packet size stays below this critical value, a single server (S I) remains responsible for 
routing and traffic management. In other words, the relation RI is a relation between network traffic per second on 
one hand and the activation of S2 (S2.) on the other hand. Is this functional dependency of  the activation of S2 on 
traffic a state variable of RI? Applying the definition of a state variable, the answer to this question is yes. The 
functional dependency of S2. on traffic is in no way deducable from other variables that make up the phenomenon. 
Suppose now however that a second relation (R2) is present, relating the treshold level of 10MB to the total number 
of computers logged on.  The more computers that are logged on, the sooner S2  will become activated (the lower 
the treshold level). R2 is thus a relation between the number of  computers logged on and the functional relationship 
representing RI. Is the mathematical expression representing RI still a state variable? The answer is no. Since the 
expression for activation of S2 is now completely determined by other variables in the system (the state variable of 
R2), the functional relationship of RI is no longer a state variable. We  state that the functional relationship of RI 
has become an output variable, a variable that is some complex function of other variables in the system. Now, let 
us take a look at the variables queue length (Q,) and maximum allowed queue length (Qmax) at S I. Is the length of 
the queue at SI a state variable? Since the queue length at SI is some complex result of other parameters (variables) 
in the system, the answer is again no. Queue length is not a variable that is not completely determined by other 
variables in the  system.  What about maximum allowed queue  length? This is again a state variable.  Since  the 
maximum queue length is in no  way influenced, deducable, determined or related to  other variables, maximum 
queue length is a state variable of  the object queue. 
Now, for a particular object Ei, the collection of state variables  {L~'}, k =  L.n, constitutes a 
space r  E,  that allows to approach the object on the basis of  a point9: 
For a relationship Pj, we define a space of causal factors  «I>  and a single dependent variable 11.  On 
the product space «I>  x 11, there exists a collection of functions from  «I>  into 11 that we shall denote 
as  cfO<!>--td'  Notice that each of these functions coincides with a particular value the single state 
variable of the relationship can attain. Hence, formally, the state space  rpj  for a relationship is 
written as: 
9 We implicitly assumed object E. can be described by a total ofn state variables. 
Information Systems Group  16 A Theory of  Structural Model Validity in Simulation 
J.  Martens et al. 
Considering the  relation between the  state variable spaces  rE;,  r pj  and their corresponding 
universes  Ei and Pj  in the  conceptual universe 3, we  assume there exist one-on-one, bijective 
mappings f and  g between respectively  elements of rEi  and  object descriptions in  3E;  10  and 
elements of rpj  and relationship specifications in 3 pj • Hence we can write: 
(7) 
Irrespective of the topological nature of rEi  or  r pj ,  we will assume that f and g are continuous 
functions,  i.e. that their image of open sets in the rx-spacell  is  open in the  space 3x and vice 
versa. This assumption is not that hard to defend since component descriptions in the r x-space are 
nothing else than a refinement of their position in the 3x-space. As a result of this assumed space 
consistency, we call the topological spaces 3x and rx homeomorphic or topological equivalent 
spaces. 
Having launched the notion of a conceptual universe, model and state space, a natural question 
to ask is  whether in a study  of some real world phenomenon one  is  obliged to come  up  with a 
triplet <3,~,{rd> that constitutes a model of complete reality. From a modelling point of view, 
the answer is  obvious:  it is  not a model of complete reality that is of concern, but a model that 
represents a particular subspace of the  latter.  In the context of modelling and simulation,  our 
interest goes to  a model  of some phenomenon that takes  place  in  our environment and that 
demands for a deeper investigation. Let us now formally define the notion of a conceptual model 
of  a system or phenomenon in reality: 
11  Let us use the general notation ofa component X instead ofthe component specific notations ofE. and Pj-
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Postulate 4: A system (S)  description is a conceptual model (~s) that is defined in a subspace 
(Bs) of  a conceptual universe (3). 
In order to fully comprehend the assertion of this postulate, let us  first clarify the distinction 
between reality, a phenomenon in reality and a system. In a practical simulation study, a model 
builder will concentrate his efforts on a part of reality (a phenomenon) that is  of interest for  his 
particular analysis. In fact,  a phenomenon is nothing else than a general observation, a sequence 
of events that occur and that demand for  a further investigation.12  In  an  attempt to  explain, to 
analyse or to simulate the phenomenon, the  analyst will strive to come up with relevant reality 
elements and relations that hopefully account for a satisfying part of the structural dynamics of 
the phenomenon. Certain reality components and state variables will have been unveiled by the 
analyst during his  research,  other elements,  relations  and  variables  will  remain absent in  his 
collection of relevant phenomenon components.  We  state that the  analyst tries to  explain the 
phenomenon through the introduction of a system S.  This system  is in fact nothing else than the 
collection of identified objects, relations and  state variables. Since this system was retrieved in 
studying a single phenomenon, we can think of the system as being a subspace of the most ample 
phenomenon that can ever be studied, i.e. a subspace of  reality. 
Definition 4:  (A system) 
A system (S)  is defined as being a collection of  reality components and interrelations together with 
a set of  state variables that comprises a subspace Ss of  a conceptual universe E. 
If  a system equals a subspace of 3  (3s),  it is only natural to associate the concept of a system's 
description with a particular point in that subspace,  ~s, where  ~s E  3s. Notice that in studying a 
phenomenon, the analyst has  a certain level of freedom to come  up with a system (a subspace) 
and a description (a point) that, according to his beliefs, allows for a powerful investigation of  the 
phenomenon. In other words,  a phenomenon can be  studied through the introduction of many 
systems,  some of which  will  be  more  effective  in explaining the  structural dynamics of the 
phenomenon than others. 
12  Examples of phenomena may  include a production process  in  a finn,  network traffic  in  a computer environment, the world's 
industrial pollution, the movement of  stars and planets, etc". In other words, any aspect of reality that one can be aware of  constitutes 
a phenomenon. 
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3.2.  From conceptual beliefs towards a formal model 
Earlier on, we stated yet that structural validation is  in theory defined on the conceptual level 
and that every conceptual model remains in fact an intangible, mental image ofreality. Since in 
practice,  it is  a  formal  specification  (or a  computer model)  that constitutes  the  subject  of 
validation, a study of the formal  modelling level and its relation to the area of conceptual models 
is required. Let us first of  all postulate the existence of a universal language L: 
Postulate 5: There exists a language (L)  with  a universe of  discourse (II) that allows us to 
describe  a  conceptual model of reality  (~) in  a formal model (1C)  up  to  any  degree  of 
precision. 
We assume that there exists a language (L) that is capable of describing any conceptual model 
up to any degree of precision. In other words, there exists a language with a universe of discourse 
(II) that puts no restriction at all  on the possibility of a model builder to accurately express his 
conceptual beliefs. The formal model (n) could then be interpreted as being a cognitive projection 
of ones beliefs onto a  specific  linguistic  geometry II. In any  case,  we  will  assume that the 
language one has chosen to explicate ones conceptual model is the language L,  no  matter ones 
philosophical scholarship. If this  would not be the case,  structural model  validation would be 
impaired by  a highly uncomfortable handicap in a way that it tries to prove the truthfulness of a 
(formal) model, knowing very well in advance that it might be the formal language itself that has 
curved adequate reality perceptions towards an invalid articulation. For preservation of validity of 
any construct proposed to measure the validity of a simulation model, it is therefore imperative 
that the language in which the formal  model resides puts no  restriction at all on the ability to 
express any theory of  reality. 
The existence of the language L and the possibility of projecting a true conceptual model onto 
the formal universe of L indicates the existence of  a relation between elements of  E and II, which 
is more profoundly expressed in the following postulate. 
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Postulate 6: There exists a one-to-many mapping (t/J) from elements in 3 to elements in n 
Having a conceptual universe and model on one hand (E &  ~) and a formal universe and model 
on the other hand (IT  &  1t),  it is  only natural to ask what kind of relation there exists between 
these conceptual  and formal  concepts.  In this postulate,  we  presume the existence of such a 
relation (4)) that represents a one-to-many mapping13  from  a conceptual model  (~) to a collection 
of formal models  ({1tj}).  Any  conceptual  state of mind can be expressed through usage of the 
language L in at least one formal model. In other words, judging the validity of the more abstract 
notion of a conceptual model  or the  concrete version of conceptual beliefs  in the shape of a 
formal model is  essentially  indifferent.  For a particular formal  model description, there exists 
only  one corresponding  conceptual  equivalent and investigating the validity  of the  latter is 
essentially in no way different from assessing the correctness and the truthfulness of  the former. 
Further, we will  assume that any  model  builder applies  the  relation  4>  to map  his  conceptual 
beliefs on a set of formal  models.  In that way, formal model errors can never be traced to the 
incapability of a system analyst to articulate his beliefs of reality. In other words, we assume that 
the model builder masters a language L with a skill of infinite precision. His final formal model 
of reality may contain errors, but these are never due to the application of an inferior language or 
the incompetence of  the analyst to express his beliefs. 
3.3.  The introduction of  time 
Since  in the  context of simulating real  world  phenomena the  notion of time  will  play  an 
incontrovertible role, it is worthwhile to investigate the repercussion of the introduction of time 
on the concepts that were introduced earlier. More specific, how do  we delineate a time varying 
reality environment within the  notion of a conceptual universe and model? And,  how do  we 
account for reality alterations in a definition of  structural validity? 
Il The one-to-many mapping takes into account a level of  semantic relativism: the ability to express a single, conceptual state of  mind 
through a multitude of  articulations. 
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In the next postulate, we define the cognitive projection of the process ofreality alteration as a 
conceptual walk: 
Postulate  7:  A  conceptual walk  (~(t),E(t)) is the process of  reality component description 
alterations in a universe that is submit to  conceptual expansion, contraction and curvature 
through time. 
In the  previous  paragraphs,  we  introduced  a  collection of time  invariant postulates.  At a 
particular moment in time, we can speak of  conceptual universes, conceptual models, phenomena, 
systems and their formal  equivalents.  Since however for most simulation studies, models  are 
developed taking into account the existence of  time, it remains to be seen what kind of effect the 
notion of time resorts on these concepts. As  soon as  one introduces the notion of time, a natural 
question that arises is whether a conceptual universe can be the subject of any modification. If 
one were just to follow the well known relationship between energy and matter, it requires only a 
minor effort to convince oneself that a conceptual universe is likely to expand in some directions 
and to contract in others. At the very moment that new matter is created, a new object comes to 
existence and an expansion has occurred. Similarly, adding relationships amongst existing objects 
implies conceptual expansion. At the same time, in light of a structural change, some variables 
that were output variables may  become state variables and vice versa. In a later paragraph, we 
will introduce the notion of conceptual orthogonality and derive that the addition or deletion of 
state variables leads to a curvature of the conceptual universe.14 Besides additions or deletions of 
components and state variables, notice that it may very well be a conceptual model itself that is 
the subject of a translation. Any  altering of an object description or a relational specification15 
results in a translation of a conceptual model along one or more dimensions of the corresponding 
conceptual universe. This process of model translations and universe modifications we shall refer 
to as a conceptual walk (~(t),3(t)). 
14 Notice that in developing a real world simulation model, the pathway of expansion, contraction and curvature, unless one has the 
ability to make changes on the fly, is determined a priori before any execution of  the model. 
15  In the assumption that one of  the state variables of  the component are changed. 
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Consider now at time t,  a conceptual model  ~(t) ofreality. What can we say about the position 
of this model at time t+8t? Given the structural identity of  ~(t) at t,  should we expect the process 
of a conceptual walk from t onwards being deterministic or stochastic? It is in a last postulate that 
we suppose the stochastic character of  conceptual walks of conceptual models of reality. 
Postulate 8: The process of  conceptual walks (/;(t),3(t)) is a stochastic process. 
We  assume that the expansion, contraction or curvature of the conceptual universe as it occurs 
is  essentially  a  stochastic process.  Let us  first  clear up  the difference  between  a stochastic 
conceptual walk on one hand and a stochastic behaviour of conceptual models on the other hand. 
Assuming  that the  process  of conceptual  changes  is  stochastic  equals  stating that,  given a 
conceptual model of reality at  some moment in time, the precise location of this model  in the 
future  is  essentially unknown.  The  assumption of a stochastic conceptual walk indicates there 
exists  some kind of complex  probability  distribution that  represents  the likelihood of future 
positions for a particular model of reality at time 1. In other words, the exact future identity of the 
model is unpredictable. Stochastic behaviour on the other hand indicates that, irrespective of the 
stochastic nature of conceptual alterations,  observations that are made from  reality are  samples 
that, if given the possibility to collect several observations, constitute a probability distribution of 
reality realisatlons16. In other words, in the unlikely event that, from a structural viewpoint, reality 
would not be changing at all,  its  behaviour would still  be a collection of stochastic processes. 
Observed behaviour processes  from  a changing reality  are thus  the  result of both probable 
(stochastic) structural changes  as  well  as  the stochastic nature of reality  itself.  As  a result,  a 
stochastic reality implies automatically stochastic behaviour but the opposite is  not necessarily 
true. 
3.3.2.  Time and validity 
Labelling the occurrence of reality  as  stochastic has  important consequences on any  study of 
modelling phenomena in reality. As a matter of  fact, the information a model builder retains when 
studying reality is in fact nothing else than a single observation of one particular realisation of 
some complex conceptual walk process. What is probably most important of all, once a model has 
been created, its stochastic future is determined in advance (unless one has the ability to "steer" 
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the model on the fly).  How should we account for this fact of determined stochastic conceptual 
alterations  in  a  later study  of structural validity  of the  evolved model?  Let us  address  this 
interesting issue by means of  the following example. 
Example 3: Stochastic conceptual evolvement and validity 
Suppose that a prominent model builder is  given the opportunity to  freeze reality and to  study extensively the 
objects and relations that make up his environment. Let us suppose that after some time he  comes up with the true 
(stochastic) conceptual model". At that particular moment, the modeler is asked to unfreeze reality and at the same 
time to start his model on a digital (super)computer. After some time, reality is frozen again and a first independent 
model consultant is asked to  verify the equality of the evolved proposed model by the analyst and the conceptual 
model of reality as  it is true  at that moment in time. Due to the stochastic nature of the process of conceptual 
evolvement in both reality and the  proposed model, the  proposed model  is  likely to  be  different from  the  true 
model. Not only will they be displaced from each other, it is  likely the conceptual universes in which they reside 
are different. Based on these considerations, the consultant judges the model to be unequal to its true equivalent and 
hence labels it as invalid. After his analysis, a second consultant is invited to perform the same task of  validation of 
the proposed model  by our prominent model builder.  Based on the stochastic nature of reality and model,  he 
concludes that in order to  found his  assertion on validity he  should be  given a collection of possible true  and 
simulated conceptual evolvements I' so that he can construct a governing probability law of both real and simulated 
structural changes.  He  goes on that once these probability laws are discovered all that matters is  that they are 
identical. Identical probability laws imply validity of  the model, not only at the time of consulting but at any time 
along the trajectory the conceptual model has followed. Finally, a third consultant shares the opinion of his second 
colleague but marks that it would never be possible to find out whether a particular conceptual model (that differs 
from reality) could be a model that resides on a different trajectory of conceptual evolvement that might have been 
realized. Given a particular true conceptual model, releasing time induces a plethora of possible conceptual models 
any time later of which only one has been realised (reality). He continues his statement to tell that if one came up 
with a conceptual model that differs from its true equivalent at some point in time, it would be impossible to judge 
whether it fits on a different realisation track since simply one has no knowledge about the nature of these different 
tracks of realisation. As a conclusion, he states that one might come up with a collection of conceptual models that 
might have been realisations of reality and that labelling one them as valid is only a matter of convention. The 
verdict on validity should be  made on a comparison of real and proposed conceptual model.  The verdict on a 
possible valid realisation should be  made on  a comparison of distrubutions  and  stochastic laws  and  remains 
inconclusive. 
For determining model validity, we state it is a comparison between model and reality that is of 
importance. Dissimilarities between the model and reality indicate a level of invalidity. But does 
16 Notice that in practice one will never be able to collect additional realisations of  a particular process in reality. 
17 The example is written in a foundational argument. 
I' In other words, he should be given a collection of  replications of  both reality and model. 
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it also mean the proposed model might never have been realised? The answer to this  question 
remains essentially open.  Since one simply has  no  knowledge about the possible trajectories of 
reality realisations through time, determining whether a model would have been a valid model of 
reality under a different occurrence of chance remains inconclusive. In any  case, if it would, we 
would call the model not a (the) valid model of reality but a possible valid realisation that might 
have taken place. 
4.  Topological cornerstones of structural validity 
Having  met  a  collection  of fundamental  postulates  that  are  indispensable  for  a  further 
elaboration on structural validity, a natural question to ask concerns the topological structure of 
the conceptual universe 3. In light of the different philosophical schools in validation, a challenge 
remains to come up with a topological variant of the duality of objectivism versus relativism. In 
other words,  can  we  express  ones  philosophical beliefs  and  ones  attitude towards  structural 
validation by  the  topological nature  of 3? It lies  within the aim of this paragraph to derive a 
natural topology  for  the  conceptual universe that would  represent  ones  proper philosophical 
attitude towards the notion of structural model validity. 
4.1.  A foundational topology 
If a conceptual universe is defined as the Cartesian product of objects and relations, what is then 
the natural topological structure of this  universe for  a foundationalist? In the theory of general 
topology, topologies can be induced by a metric or distance function or they can be constructed 
irrespective of  the notion of distance. In light of our discussion, it is the former type of topologies 
that is  of particular interest. Let us  first introduce some basic topological concepts. A topology 
(T) on a  non-empty  set X  is  generally  defined  as  the  class  of subsets  of X  that satisfy the 
following properties [Lipschutz 1965]: 
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A class T of  subsets (1:1> 1:2,  ..•  )  of  a non-empty set X  is a topology on X  ~ 
(1)  X  /\ ~ E T  (X  and the empty set belong to 1) 
k 
(2)  U  1:,  E T, any I, k  /\ k > I  (The union of  any members ofT  belongs to  1) 
j;;/ 
(3)  (The intersection of  any pair of  members of  T belongs to 1) 
The elements 'ti of the topology T on X are called T  -open sets and are subsets of  X. Applying the 
notion of a topology to a component of a conceptual universe, the set X equals the collection of 
all  component  descriptions.  Notice  that  it  was  yet  assumed  there  is  in fact  a  one-on-one 
relationship between these component descriptions and points in the state variable space.  Since 
the component is completely described in the state variable space, the question of the topological 
nature of  X parallels the issue of the topological nature of  r x.  Let us have a look at a single state 
variable :r.; within r x.  With the binary attitude of deciding on structural validity in mind, can we 
defme a topology that would be the natural topology for  :r.;? If  validation is generally a matter of 
a binary comparison, we might state that validation of a particular facet in a global description of 
a component is  a matter of determining whether the description of that facet (state variable) 
coincides with its single true counterpart. In other words, the binary outlook on validation sounds 
very similar to an application of the so-called trivial metric in the r x-space. Let us first formally 
define a metric or a distance function for a space X as follows [Lipschutz 1965]: 
Definition 6:  (A metric or distance function li) 
A real valued  function li from X x X into 9t is called a metric or distance function on X ~ 
(2)  (symmetry) 
(3)  li(X1>XJJ  ~  li(Xl,Xz} + li(X2,XJJ  (triangle inequality) 
(4)  if  Xl  cp X2 then li(XbXz} > 0 
Having defined a metric or distance function, the definition of  the trivial metric is uncomplicated: 
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Definition 7:  (The trivial metric) 
A well defined metric (5 on X is called the trivial metric <=>  \7' XI>  X2  E  X: 
(1)  XI =  Xl ~  (5(XI>XV  =  0 
(2)  Xl ;C X2 ~  (5(X1,XV  =  1 
In other words, the trivial metric assigns the value null or one to the distance between a pair of 
points, depending on their equality. As a matter of fact,  applying the trivial metric in validation is 
the  most undiluted expression of an  objectivistic  temperament.  Facets  (state  variables) of a 
component are either perfectly well described or completely erroneous. An adequate description 
of a facet is  indicated by  its zero distance towards the single true description. Description errors 
invoke a displacement with  respect to  the true  portrayal  and induce  a distance increase from 
absolute validity (zero) to absolute invalidity (one). As a matter of fact, zero and one are the only 
distance-oriented expressions an objectivist will apply in an assessment of  description accuracy. 
Having related this trivial metric to the yardstick of validation for a foundationalist, can we now 
determine a natural foundational topology? Let us first launch the notion of an open sphere in the 
space of a particular state variable  L~. The collection of points (state variable values) that are 
situated within a distance r from a point  (j~ is called an open sphere around  (j~ with radius r: 
Definition 8:  (An open sphere) 
An open sphere S(  a~  ,r) around  a~ with radius r is the collection of  all points that are situated 
within a distance r from  a~. 
S(a~,r)= {s.O(a~,s)<r} 
In  deriving a natural topology for the space  L~, the notion of a base and subbase needs to be 
defined first. A class of open sets is called a base for a topology if  and only if: 
Definition 9:  (A base for a topology 1) 
A class B of  subsets of  T is called a base for T <=> any open set of  T can be written as the union of 
members of  B. 
A subbase is generally defined as a class of subsets of a topology for which taking the family of 
all finite intersections forms a base for that topology: 
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A class S of  subsets of  T is called a subbase for T <=> the family of  finite intersections of  members of 
Sforms a basefor T 
Now, it can be proven [Lipschutz 1965] that the class of open spheres in a set r.f with metric 1) 
constitutes a base for a topology on r.f. Further, consider an open sphere S( of ,r) with radius r 
E  ]0,1] surrounding a point of. This sphere contains the singleton of: S( of ,r) =  {  o~}. Since 
every sphere is by definition open, every singleton set is open and since the union of open sets is 
open again, every set is open. As a result, the class of  all singleton subsets of r.f forms a base for 
a  topology on  r.~. We call  this topology,  that constitutes of all  subsets of r.f  the discrete 
topology Td on r.f and we call the space (r.f ,Td) a discrete topological space. 
Having defined the natural topology of a single state variable space, can we from here induce 
the natural topology for the entire state space and finally for the conceptual universe? Notice that 
for a particular component X, the state space is a countable, finite product of several state variable 
spaces. Following general topology theory, we can define the so-called product topology on r  x 
as: 
Definition 11:  (The product topology) 
The product topology Tp defined on a product of  sets r  x  '" X I~ is the topology generated by the 
i 
inverse projections from the I~  's into rJr 
In search for a basis of this finite product topology T  p,  one considers the collection of inverse 
projections from state variable spaces (r.f) into the state space r x.  Notice that an inverse 
projection of an open subset of r.f,  P::!r  x ('tF) is  defined as  the collection of points whose 
projection falls within the open subset 'tF. Now, it  can be proven that the class of subsets, 
generated by taking the product of an open subset  'tF  of a state variable space r.f  with the 
collection of all other state variable spaces -, r.f -hence by  looking at the inverse projection of 
'tF  into r x - generates a subbase for the product topology Tp  on r x. This subbase is referred to 
as the  defining subbase for  the product topology.  Following the definition of a  subbase, the 
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collection of finite intersections of members of this class of subsets forms the (defining) base for 
the product topology Tp  on ['x. Now, since each of the state variable spaces is  discrete, it can be 
proven the  product topology  on the product of discrete spaces  is  again the  discrete topology. 
Further, since we  stated the space ['x is  homeomorph with Ex, the natural topology on Ex is  the 
discrete topology. Finally, since E is the Cartesian product of  the individual spaces Ex, the natural 
topology on E is  the discrete topology. As a result, the foundational attitude towards modelling 
and validation induces the notion of a trivial metric as  the yardstick for validity assessment and 
naturally defines the discrete topology on E. 
Theorem 1:  (The natural foundational topology of  S) 
For a foundationalist,  the  natural topology on :5 is the discrete product topology,  induced by the 
trivial metric. 
4.2.  An anti-foundational topology 
If for a foundationalist, the conceptual universe is naturally equipped with the discrete topology 
and the trivial metric, a natural question to ask is whether this particular metrisation still holds for 
the anti-foundationalist. According to the relativistic approach to  validation, models (and hence 
component descriptions) are  more or  less  valid depending on their usefulness,  their practical 
value, their ability to survive tests and criticism or their social acceptance. In other words, the 
foundation to which the validity  of theories or models  should be  verified  is  relative,  context 
dependent  and  non-unique.  Consider  now  in  an  objective,  foundational  context,  for  each 
component  X  the true description  X in  the  true  state  space  t  x. Further,  consider the  true 
conceptual model  ~ in the true conceptual universe  E. Remember that for a foundationalist, the 
set of all true descriptions of component X  (~x) is the singleton {X}, the collection of untrue 
component descriptions (Ix) is the set -,  ~x and that the distance between X  and any other point 
in  Ex  equals  1, no matter their closeness. In the context of relativism however, can we still apply 
the notion of this single true conceptual model  of the world  ~ and this single true conceptual 
universe E? First, since the foundation to validate theories is relative, we might have to give up 
the objective  uniqueness of the true conceptual universe  E.  Further,  since in deciding about 
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model validity every participant has its own view of the world, its own perceptions of what the 
model should be capable of explaining and hence its own impressions about the usefulness of the 
model within the operational context it has been constructed, from a relativistic point of view, we 
might have to give up the consensus about the  existence of a single, true model of reality  ~ as 
well. Now, in light of this anti-foundational context, it is  only natural to accept that the distance 
between a pair of models  is  not objectively or unanimously  defined,  but becomes a fuzzy  or 
vague  expression.  In  addition,  a more  powerful  distance  expression than the  trivial,  binary 
objective Oil-metric is desired. Since both the position of the true model and universe as well as 
the validity of a proposed model is  fuzzy  and context dependent,  it feels  only natural to define 
structural model  validity as  a fuzzy  distance towards a fuzzy  set of possible valid models  in a 
fuzzy set oftme universes. (see [Fuller 1995, Zimmerman 1996] for an introduction to fuzzy  set 
theory) 
Having launched the notion of validity as a context dependent fuzzy distance number, what can 
we say about the repercussion on the topological nature of the conceptual universe for a relativist? 
As a matter of fact, we will derive that the notion of a relative, fuzzy distance metric on the unit 
interval will  induce the so-called discrete fuzzy  topology. Let us  first formally  define a fuzzy 
topology as follows [Wong 1975]: 
Definition 12:  (AJuzzy topology) 
A class T oJfozzy subsets (iI' i 2, .. .) oj  a non-empty set X is afozzy topology on X  <=> 
(1)  X A  0  E  T  (X  and the empty set belong to  T) 
k 
(2)  U  ii E T, any /, k  1\  k > /  (The union oj  any members oj T belongs to T) 
j=/ 
(3)  (The intersection oj  any pair oj  members oj T belongs 
to  T) 
The subsets ii'  i2 ,  ... are called fuzzy open sets and the space (X, T) is called a fuzzy topological 
space.  Similarly to  our foundational analysis,  the one-on-one relationship between component 
descriptions  in  X  with  elements  of the  state  variable  space r x translates  the  issue  of the 
topological nature of X towards the topological nature of r x.  Let us consider again a single state 
variable  Li'.  Notice that the  true  description  of the facet  Li'  is  relative,  unknown and  the 
distance from  alternative descriptions of Li'  is  a  fuzzy  number.  In  parallel  to  the  classical 
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definition of a metric, let us  define a fuzzy metric or fuzzy  distance function as follows  [Kaleva 
1984]: 
Definition 13:  (A fuzzy metric c5) 
A fuzzy real valued function 0 from X x X -->  G19  is called a fuzzy metric or  fuzzy distance function 
o  ~  if  Xl,  X,.  X3  E  X 
(1)  O(XbX,) ~ 020  ~  Xl  ~  X2 
(3)  O(XbXV:S O(XbX,)  $  O(X2,XJJ with  Ell  defined as the fuzzy addition operator 
In the context of relativism, it feels only natural to extend the 011  domain of the trivial metric to 
the  whole  range  of distances  situated within the  interval  [0,1].  In  that respect,  the  distance 
between a pair of points becomes a number, ranging from  strong validity (distance 0) towards 
strong invalidity (distance 1). Further, since validity or invalidity of a model is not unanimously 
decided upon and  depends highly on the particular worldviews of the  model stakeholders, the 
precise distance from a model towards its true equivalent remains fuzzy. In other words, we state 
that model validity becomes a fuzzy number on the interval [0,1]. In parallel to our foundational 
derivation, let us define a fuzzy trivial metric as a normal upper convex fuzzy real number on the 
unit interval [0,1]: 
Definition 14:  (A fuzzy trivial metric) 
A well defined fuzzy metric 0 is called a fuzzy trivial metric <=:> 
(2)  XI,e X2 ~  O(XI,X,)  E  F[o,l] with F[O,I] the set of  all normal, upper convexfozzy sets on 
the unit interval [0,1] 
In view of a fuzzy trivial metric as the yardstick for assessing model validity, can we derive the 
natural topology for an anti-foundationalist? Let us first introduce the notion of an a-open sphere 
sa< (j~  ,r) as follows [Das 1999]: 
19 G represents the set of  all upper semi continuous Donnal convex fuzzy real positive numbers. 
20 The upper dot is used to indicate the fuzzy set that assigns the membership value I at the proposed number and 0 elsewhere. 
Information Systems Group  30 Definition 15:  (An  a-open sphere) 
A Theory of  Structural Model Validity in Simulation 
J.  Martens et al. 
An a-open sphere  Si(J~,r), a  E  JO,lJ and r >  0,  surrounding a point  (J~, is the fuzzy set of 
points with membership value afar which the supremum of  the a-cut of  their distance to  (J~ < r. 
Notice that an a-open sphere with radius r around a state variable value  cr~ equals a fuzzy set of 
points for which taking the upper limit of the a_cut21  of their distance to  cr;,  is  smaller than r. 
Can we claim that the family of a-open spheres forms a base for the space  r.;'? Let us look at the 
definition of  a fuzzy base and fuzzy subbase first: 
Definition 16:  (AjUzzy base for a topology) 
A set B is a fuzzy base for a fuzzy topology T  <=> every member of T can be written as the union 
of  members of B  . 
Definition 17:  (Afuzzy subbase for a topology) 
A set S is afuzzy subbase for afuzzy topology T  <=> the family offinite intersections of S  forms a 
fuzzy base for T. 
Now consider the class of all a-open spheres with radius r E  ]0,1] and a  E  ]0,1] surrounding a 
point  cr;,  in r.;'. Since the distance between  cr;,  and any other point of r.;'  is  an upper convex 
fuzzy  normal number  on  [0,1],  we  can always  find,  for  any  a  and for  any  subspace of r.;' 
including  cr;', an a-open sphere  with  radius  r that contains  the  fuzzy  singleton  {cr;'} with 
membership value a. Further, letting the subspace of r.;'  approach r.;', there remains always a 
collection of radii for which holds that open spheres with a radius an element of that collection 
contain the fuzzy singleton  cr~. In other words, the class of  all a-open spheres covers at least the 
family of all a-open fuzzy singletons in  r.;'. Notice that by taking the union of members of the 
class of a-open fuzzy singletons, we can construct any fuzzy  open subset of the space  r.;'. As  a 
21  An a-cut of  a nonnal, upper convex fuzzy number is defined as the set of points whose membership value to the fuzzy set is at least 
a. 
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result, we state that the class of all  a-open spheres and a fuzzy trivial metric being a fuzzy upper 
convex normal number on [0,1]  generates the family of all fuzzy  open subsets of Lf, which is 
referred to as the fuzzy discrete topology on  Lf. The space  Lf together with the fuzzy discrete 
topology  Td  is  called  the  fuzzy  discrete  topological  space  (Lf, Td)'  In  parallel  to  our 
foundational analysis, we can now derive the natural  topology for the  entire state space of the 
component X. We define the product fuzzy topology as: 
Definition 18:  (The productfuzzy topology) 
The fuzzy product topology  f  on  a product of  sets  T x  ""  X I:, each equipped with a fuzzy 
p  . 
topology, is the fuzzy topology generated by the inverse fuzzy projections from the I:  's intoTx-
In a derivation similar to our foundational analysis, a defining fuzzy  base and subbase for the 
product fuzzy topology can be defined in the following manner.  Consider the family of inverse 
projections of fuzzy sets ::rf, all j and i, {p=! (::rf)}. Consider the class of all finite intersections 
of this family. Now it can be proven [Wong 1975] the class of finite intersections and the family 
of inverse projections form respectively a defining fuzzy base and fuzzy subbase for a topology. 
This topology  is  referred to  as  the product fuzzy  topology,  generated by  a family  of inverse 
projections. In order to derive the topological nature of this product fuzzy topology, consider the 
family of inverse projections of fuzzy base sets. Since for each space in the product, fuzzy base 
sets form a family of fuzzy singletons, the inverse projection of each base set into r x is a family 
of cylindrically extended fuzzy singletons. Finite intersections of fuzzy singletons are again fuzzy 
singletons. As a result, defining the discrete fuzzy topology on each space of the product induces 
the discrete product fuzzy topology on r x.  Since it is assumed r x is fuzzy homeomorph with Ex, 
Ex forms  a discrete fuzzy  topological  space.  Finally,  it is  easy to  see the  product space E  is 
equipped  with the  discrete  fuzzy  topology.  As  a result,  moving from  an objective  approach 
towards a relative attitude to validation constitutes a fuzzification of the conceptual universe. The 
natural topology for the relativist is the fuzzy  analogue of the discrete product topology for the 
objectivist. 
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For an anti-foundationalist,  the  natural topology on  S  is  the fuzzy discrete product topology, 
induced by a fuzzy trivial metric. 
5.  Sources of conceptual errors 
Before  we  address  ourselves  to  a formal  definition  of structural  model  validity  for  both 
objectivists and relativists, let us  first have a look at possible conceptual modelling errors that 
might occur and discuss their effect on the conceptual universe, the conceptual model and the 
state  space.  In modelling real  world  phenomena,  we  might  expect the model  builder to  be 
burdened  with  an  enterprise  of immense  complexity.  Armed  with  a  careful  collection  of 
observational data, it is essentially a matter of  his rational capabilities how well he can infer from 
his observations accurate descriptions of system components.  Since the information base for the 
analyst is a mixture of effects, caused by a plethora of reality elements and relations, it will be a 
gigantic challenge to  decompose  the  information in  an accurate  set of elements,  description 
variables, causal factors and dependency relations. Therefore,  it is  likely the model builder will 
commit errors. It is presumable that the mass of data he receives from the system under study will 
imply a level  of rational confounding where the analyst comes up with misspecified functional 
dependencies, non-existing causal influences, erroneous descriptions, invalid state variables, etc ... 
Ruling out, overlooking or ignoring certain reality components or state variables is likely to bring 
about a cascade of fault  perceptions that shifts  a conceptual model  miles  away  from  its  true 
location. Before we make an attempt to  come  up  with  a classification of possible modelling 
errors,  let  us  first  have  a  look  at  the  conceptual  repercussion  of ignoring  certain  reality 
components and state variables. 
5.1.  A model in a subspace of reality 
In any practical simulation study, an analyst will focus his modelling efforts on some fragment 
of reality, making abstraction of a large pool of other reality objects and interrelationships. Hence, 
the  constructed  model  will  contain  only  a  subset  of existing  elements  and  relations  that, 
hopefully, together account for  an acceptable part of the structural dynamics  of the system of 
interest. Moreover,  one will probably not attempt to come  up  with the full  collection of state 
variables for  every particular reality component. In summary, the model builder will come up 
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with a perceived conceptual universe  3s, a perceived conceptual model  ~s and a collection of 
state variable spaces for every included component {rk  }22. Having introduced a metric approach 
to the notion of validity, how do we measure the distance from a system description in 3s to the 
true model of reality? Notice that,  for an  objectivist, the  collection  (S~) of true models is  the 
singleton {  ~  }, residing in a unique space S that forms the only member of the collection of valid 
conceptual spaces (S::J.  Conversely, for a relativist, the collection of valid conceptual spaces is a 
fuzzy  set  ~s and for  every fuzzy  space  8, there exists a fuzzy  collection  ~~ of possible true 
conceptual models  ~. In order to ease notation, let us stick to the fuzzy notation of ~s to denote 
the collection of true conceptual universes. In case of an objectivist, the membership function of 
~s can be thought of as  a special function that assigns the value  1 for  a single universe and 0 
elsewhere.  Similarly,  let us  use  ~~  (8) to  denote  the fuzzy  collection of true models  for  a 
particular conceptual universe. Note that for an objectivist,  ~s  ==  { S} and  ~~  (S)  ==  { ~}. In other 
words,  depending on the particular form of the membership functions,  the notation of ~s and 
~~ (8) can be used for both objectivists and relativists without loss of generality. 
Returning to our prime issue of measuring the distance between a point in a proposed space 3s 
and the collection of  true points  {~~  (8), all  8 E  ~s}, let us for the moment assume that 3s is a 
- - 23  -- ~  subspace of every  S  for which  f.l~3 ( S) > 0  , and that for each component X in Ss, r x  =  r x. 
Now, in portraying a conceptual model, defined in a space 3s, in a true universe  8, we construct 
the inverse projection of the conceptual model in  3s into the space  8. This leaves us with a well-
defined open set  p~s(  ~s) in  8. Let us  denote the open set that equals the inverse projection as 
the set  1:s in the space 8. We call the portrayal of ~s in 8 (1:s) the natural extension of ~s: 
Definition J  9:  (The natural extension of  a model) 
The natural extension of  a model  ~s that resides in a space  E  s  into a space  §  is the open set :r Ii 
formed by taking the inverse projection of  ~s into  §. 
22 The tilde embellishment is used to stress the fact the conceptual model and universe are particular perceptions ofthe model builder. 
23 The symholl1 is used to denote the membership function. 
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Since we  assumed  '='s  is  a subspace  of every  ~ for  which  fl~E (3) >  0,  and  that for  each 
component X, f x  =  f x, measuring the distance from the extended model  p  ~s(  ~s) to its true 
equivalent  ~s (3) coincides with measuring the distance between an inverse projected open set 
P~s(  ~s) and a resident open set  ~s (3) of 3. For an objectivist, this procedure is easy and the 
1  - • 
distance equals the value 0 if the set  P='s(~s) covers the true model  ~s. On the other hand, a 
relativist is  confronted with a collection of possible natural extensions. As  a matter of fact,  for 
each 3 for which  f..L~E (3) > 0, we can think of a natural extension of ~s into  3. Notice that for 
a particular  3, the fuzzy set of valid models is given by  ~s (  3). Hence, the distance between an 
inverse projected set  P~s(  ~s) into  a particular  3 and the resident fuzzy  set of valid models 
~s (3) becomes a distance between a pair of fuzzy  sets.  The  final  measure of validity of  ~s 
becomes some aggregate of all  individual fuzzy  distances, where the validity of each conceptual 
universe is  combined with the distance of P~8(  ~s) to the fuzzy  set of valid models within that 
universe. 
What happens in case some state spaces for  components in  Ss are not identical to their real 
equivalents but are subspaces of the latter? More specifically, what happens if one has not only 
made  abstraction  of certain reality  components  but  also  confined  the  description  of some 
components to a subset of their state variables? In that case, some  f x  would be  a subspace of 
f'  x' i.e.  some  f x c f'  x. Let  us  denote  the  collection  of true  state  spaces  for  a  particular 
component X as  ~r  and let us assume that  f x is a subspace of every  f'  x for which  f..L?  (f'  x) >  x  ~~ 
o.  Applying  an  analogue  of the  natural  extension  in  the r  space,  we  associate  with each 
component description in  f x  a  collection of descriptions  in  each  f'  x  for  which  holds  that 
f..L?  (f'x) >  O.  In other words, we  construct the inverse projection of elements of fx into  f'x, 
~rx 
i.e. we consider  P~fx  (yx) for  each  f'x. Since in general there exists a fuzzy homeomorphism 
between the spaces 3x and r x,  every element of Sx is  matched with a(n) (fuzzy) open subset 
iSx  of every  possible  space  3x . We  will  refer to this  process  of matching  as  the  natural 
extension of a model component: 
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Definitian 20:  (The natural extension of  a model component) 
The natural extension of  a description of  a model component Ex. that is described in a space r  x • 
isformed by taking the inverse projection of  the description  ~x into the space  f x' 
In the assumption that  3s  is  still a subspace of every  3 for which  J.l.~" ( 3) > 0,  but that there 
exists now a component X in  3s for which f x c f x  and that f x  is a subspace of every  f x  for 
which  J.l.?  (f  x) > 0, what can we tell about the distance of a conceptual model in 3s towards its  ,rx 
collection of real  equivalents? Similarly to  the  natural  extension of a model,  we  consider the 
inverse projections of mapped elements of 3x  into each possible  3. Logically, the removal of a 
state variable in addition to an entire component, induces a superset of inverse projections in each 
3 in relation to the set that was generated by the sole removal of the component. Once again, for 
an objectivist, the  construct "each  3" is  read  as  the  singleton  S.  Only  if the  set  of inverse 
projections covers the single true model  in  S,  the  proposed model  ~s is  called valid.  For a 
relativist, inverse projections can be made for  each possible  3. The distance between the set of 
inverse projections  {P~3(  ~s)} and its family of true equivalents in a particular 3 is a distance 
between a set of inverse projections and a fuzzy  resident set of true models  in  3.  Again,  an 
aggregation operator is  needed to combine the validity of conceptual universes  3 and the fuzzy 
distance from the set of  inverse projections to its family of  true equivalents in 3. 
5.2.  Type 3, type l; and type r errors 
In the previous paragraph,  we  deliberately restrained our analysis to  conceptual models  and 
universes that are completely contained in every of their possible true equivalents. As a matter of 
fact, we indicated how the distance concept should be applied when comparing models that reside 
in a subspace of one another. It lies within the aim of this paragraph to extend our discussion of 
the distance concept when models may reside in spaces that are completely different, i.e. that do 
not necessarily  form  subspaces  of one  another.  In  an  attempt  to  compose  an  overview  of 
modelling errors, let us clarify the concept of an error first.  Consider at a particular moment in 
time the collection of  true conceptual universes  ~3 and true conceptual models of reality  {~~  (3), 
all  3 E  ~3}' For a foundationalist,  we  state an error occurs  at the very  moment a proposed 
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description of a reality component deviates from its true counterpart, at the moment the proposed 
conceptual universe contains non-existing objects or relations (the  universe becomes partially 
complex24)  or at the moment the collection of state variables that were defined for a particular 
component is a superset of  the true set of state variables (the state space is partially complex). As 
a matter of fact,  we  call these types of errors respectively type  ~, type S  and type r  errors. 
Complex  conceptual  universes  or  state  spaces  and  translated  conceptual  models  form  the 
topological representatives of  foundational errors. But what about an anti-foundationalist? We 
claim that the same types of errors may occur (complexity and translation) but that their relation 
towards validity is  different. Notice carefully that the occurrence of errors and their relation to 
validity are highly unpredictable for an anti-foundationalist. In some cases, it may be that models 
containing a vast amount of errors are more useful, acceptable or robust than others. So, in the 
context of relativism, their degree of validity may be higher than models that would contain fewer 
errors. Notice also that, in some operational context, a model containing only a few errors may be 
less useful or acceptable (valid) than in another operational environment. The amount of errors is 
in that way no indication at all  of the adherence to the set of valid models.  Additionally, the 
adherence to the set of valid models is a relative concept, highly depending on the operational 
context of  the model. So, as a conclusion, foundationalists and anti-foundationalists will agree on 
the existence and the interpretation of the concept of an error, but in contrast to the former, the 
latter will see the accumulation of errors as  a modification of a model's validity, represented by 
its fuzzy distance membership function. 
Type 
r 
Source of  error 
inclusion of  non-existing elements or 
relations 
mathematical misspecification of  relations 
or inclusion of  entity description errors 
inclusion of  non-driving causal factors or 
non-existing state variables 
Table 1: Possible sources of modelling errors 
In  Table  1,  we  listed  possible  sources  of errors  for  both  foundationalists  and  anti-
foundationalists, which we shall discuss below. 
24 The notion of  complexity of  a conceptual universe resembles the notion of  complex numbers in standard algebra. 
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5.2.1.  Type E error 
An analyst commits a type E error if he includes objects, entities or relations in his conceptual 
model that do not reside in any  part of reality. More specifically, a type E error occurs if there 
exists at least one possible conceptual universe that does not include the proposed component by 
the model builder. Formally: 
Definition 21:  (A  type E error) 
In proposing a conceptual universe  E  s. we state an error of  type E occurs <=>:3  E. f.lq • (E) > 0: 
From a collection of observational data, the analyst may have derived a causal influence among a 
set of variables that essentially does  not exist25• Likewise, the model  builder may  erroneously 
have concluded the presence of a particular system component from  inspected behaviour.  The 
frequency of type 2:  errors, caused by  induction of absent relationships, heavily depends on the 
cognitive robustness of the model builder. How strong will the analyst's conceptual determination 
resist not to induce non-existing relationships from apparent correlational behaviour? It is  likely 
that, approaching a phenomenon of reality by  a subset of elements and relations, the combined 
influence of both included and omitted reality elements and relationships will prevent the analyst 
from coming up with a justified collection of  causal dependencies. 
Example 4a: A foundational illustration of  a type E error 
Suppose that in  a fictive  queuing system,  there exists a relation  between the  length of the  queue  (Q.), the 
activation of a second server (S2.) and the average working rate of the primary servant (S 100)'  The relation, as  it 
resides in reality is depicted in the left side of  the figure below. 
"  Taking a queuing process as an example model, the analyst might incorrectly claim that the average number of  customer arrivals per 
hour is functionally dependent of  the number of  sunshine hours during the morning. Although reality may utter a level of correlation 
between sunshine hours and average customer arrival rate,  in case a true causal relation is absent, the inclusion of any  such kind of 
relationship leads to a type E error. 
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Figure 2: (Left) Present relation between Q" S2. and S1., (Right) Perceived relation between Q" and S1 ... 
Suppose now that a system analyst is given the opportunity to construct a model of the above queuing system and 
that he comes up with a model in which the existence of the second server is excluded. Either he decided the server 
plays a minor role in the dynamics of the queuing system, either he is completely ignorant regarding the presence of 
the second servant. In any case, exclusion of the  server will inevitably lead to an exclusion of both relationships 
PQ" ->S2.  and  PS2•  ->SI., • Moreover, as a result of  the residing causal influences, there will probably be an apparent 
correlation between the  queue  length  (Q,,)  and  the  working  rate  of server  I  (SI.,).  Consequently, it  is not 
unthinkable the analyst will come up with a causal dependency of  working rate on queue length, i.e. he will infer a 
relation  P Q"  ->SI., • As a result of his simplified look on the queuing phenomenon, an error of  type S has occurred. 
Whether the effect of ignoring server 2 will stop at the sole,  erroneous inference of the relationship  P Q"  ->SI., 
remains however to be seen. It is not improbable that the analyst doesn't recognize the correlation between Q" and 
S I., as being causal and instead concludes there must be some kind of  operator that controls the speed of server I. 
In that case, the inclusion of an operator involves the inclusion of a non-existing object and hence a type S  error 
will once again occur. 
In the previous example, we indicated that the act of leaving out certain objects (or relations) in 
a model  is  largely responsible  for  inducing  other,  non-existing  objects  or relations.  From  a 
foundational point of view,  as  a result of this  inclusion of essentially absent components, the 
retained conceptual universe  Bs  is partially a subspace of S and partially complex (not existing 
in  S). What about the foundational validity of a model  ~s that resides in the complex space  Bs? 
Attempting to  make  the  natural  extension  of  ~s  into  S results  in  a  degeneration.  As  an 
unfortunate  consequence of the  inclusion of a  non-existing component,  we  state that,  for  a 
foundationalist, the model  ~s as  a whole  is  invalid.  As a matter of fact,  there exists no  real 
natural extension of  ~s that is completely contained in S. For analysing the repercussion of a 
complex space on anti-foundational validity, let us rephrase our example as follows: 
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Example 4b: An anti-foundational illustration of  a type Z error 
Consider the same collection of objects as  in the previous example: Q (queue), SI (server I) and S2 (server 2). 
However,  let us  imagine the  situation where  it  is  unclear whether the speed of server  I  is  influenced by  the 
activation of server 2 or by the queue length. In contrast to our foundational example, we thus state that the precise 
set of  components that define this phenomenon in reality remains a fuzzy picture. Where the relationships  PQ,  .... S2n 
and  PS2n .... 51'"  determined reality in  a foundational  context, we  are  now confronted with a triplet of possible 
relations that might individually,  combined or all together constitute the  causal  interdependencies within  our 
phenomenon. In the  figure below,  we  indicated the undeterminance about the existence of these relations by  an 
additional arc on each relationship. 
Figure 3: Undeterminance about the true nature of a queuing phenomenon 
Suppose now additionaly that, in analyzing the phenomenon, one has agreed that it is either the direct influence of 
queue length or the indirect activation of server 2 that accounts for the speed modification of  server I, but certainly 
not both. In other words, there exists a pair of conceptual universes (one containing the single relation  P  Q, .... 51. '  the 
other containing the relations  PQ,  .... S2n  and  PS2n .... 51"') that are believed to be possible universes explaining the 
phenomenon. In light of these considerations, when will a type S error then occur? As a matter of  fact, choosing a 
particular influence path (direct or indirect) automatically induces an error since there exists a possibility that the 
retained choice is incorrect. In other words, there exists no real natural extension of models that follow the direct 
path into the universe of indirect path models and vice versa.  So choosing a particular influence scenario invokes an 
error in the context of a particular world view. Notice carefully since both possible conceptual world views do not 
share any relation, there exists no method to accurately describe the phenomenon in all possible shades of reality 
awareness. What happens now if the coexistence of both direct and indirect influence would become possible? In 
that case, choosing for a double causal dependency of service rate (on both queue length and activation) does not 
invoke any error in  light of the world view that accepts this coexistence. Notice that in light of the other views, 
incorporating both direct and indirect relationships will invoke a type S error. And still, there exists no  conceptual 
model that would fit  all shades of reality  awareness.  What happens  if only the  coexistence  of both types of 
influences would constitute the single valid world view? In that case, we can construct for every model the natural 
extension into the space, representing the coexistence of the relations. In that respect, no type S  error will occur 
when modelling either the direct, the indirect or the combined path. 
From an anti-foundational point of view,  the  validity repercussion of including particular 
objects or relations becomes a world view dependent issue. At the very moment that there exists a 
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possible worldview that does not allow for the existence of an included component, we state an 
error of type S  has occurred. Notice that within that worldview, the inverse projection of the 
proposed model results in a degeneration. 
5.2.2.  Type!; error 
A type  ~ error occurs when an  analyst failed to correctly position an object with respect to a 
particular  description variable,  or  when  he  felt  short in  an  accurate  revelation  of the  true 
expression that governs  a specific relationship.  Of course,  the  interpretation of the constructs 
"accurate" and "true" are  scholar dependent. For an objectivist, the position of the  conceptual 
model of the analyst is  simply shifted or translated somehow along the particular dimension that 
represents  the misspecified relation or erroneous  object description.  As  a result,  the  distance 
between true and proposed description raises from absolute 0 to 1 and the model is called invalid 
due to the occurrence of a type  ~ error. For a relativist however, altering a component description 
will still translate a conceptual model  but the effect of this  translation on validity is  different. 
Since the collection of true models in a particular conceptual universe is a fuzzy set, it is likely a 
conceptual shift will induce an alteration of  the membership value to the set of  valid models. 
Definition 22:  (A type ~  error) 
In proposing a conceptual model  ~s' we state an error of  type  ~  occurs ~  3  ~  , §,  !l<_ (§) > 0 A 
~  -1  _  ~ 
!l<,(3/~» 0:  P->3(~S) n  Q;(E) =  0. 
The following example is  an extension of the fictitious queuing system launched previously to 
illustrate the occurrence of a type ~ error. 
Example 5a: Afoundational illustration of  a type ~  error 
Let us extend the example of  the previous section and assume the presence of  an operator who permantly controls 
the activation of the second server in addition to the causal relation  PQ,  ->S2 •. If, for some reason, the operator or 
his relation in regard to  the  activation of server 2 is  not recognized in the model of an analyst, what will be the 
repercussion of  this omission on the mathematical specification of  the relations  PQ,  ->S2.  and  PS2. ->SI", ? Since the 
activation behaviour of server 2 is not completely explainable by looking at the queue length factor alone, the 
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mathematical formula that represents  Po, ->52.  will probably become confounded with the operator's relation 
Po  ..,52  into a  perceived dependency  Po  ->52  .  A  similar reasoning leads to an incorrect representation of  x  ex  A  a 
PS2 •  ..,51"  (PS2 •  ..,51,,)·  In any  case,  the conceptual model as inferred by the  model builder will probably be 
displaced from its true equivalent. The figure below illustrates the occurrence of a misspecification of  tbe relations 
between tbe queue and server 2,  and server 1 and  server 2.  In addition to the  notation that was introduced 
previously, a condition variable X is defined that, if  true, fires an "entity" along tbe relationship  POx ..,S2.' causing 
the activation of  server 2 irrespective of  the queue length. In tbe right portion of  the figure, the relation  Pax ..,S2.  is 
not recognized and, as a probable consequence, neither will be the condition variable X. Moving from left to right in 
Figure 4, the occurrence of a type S  error becomes apparent in the altered functional specifications of the residual 
causal relationships. 
Figure 4: Omission of a relationship leads to incorrect specifications of causal dependencies 
Example 5h: An anti-foundational illustration of  a type  ~  error 
In an anti-foundational context, let us assume tbat every possible conceptual universe contains the components 0, 
Q, 81  and 82, tbe relations  POX"'S2.,  Po, ->52.  and  PS2"  ..,51"  and tbe state variables X,  t..,  00,  Qt, Ph P2 and p,". In 
otber words, universes that would not contain at least one of these elements are believed to be impossible (tbey 
have no support in the set of valid universes). Now, differing from our foundational discussion, suppose tbe true 
mathematical expression representing a  relationship remains a  fuzzy set on a  domain of possible functional 
dependecy relations." In the figure below, we indicated this level of  fuzziness surrounding the true model by means 
of a fuzzy set of  valid functional dependency forms for each causal relation. In light of this "world view" scenario, 
when will an error of type S  occur? As a matter of fact,  in the event one would construct a model witb particular 
expressions for the residing causal relations for which there is no support in the fuzzy set of valid models for a 
particular conceptual universe, an error of type S  takes place. 80, in search of an occurrence of a type S  error, one 
should look at every possible conceptual universe individually and decide on tbe support of valid models for the 
26 The state variables PI,  P2 and P3 represent the state variables of  the relations  PQ ). -+S20:'  PS2cr, -+Sl oo  and  POl-+S2cr, . 
"Let us assume tbere is no argument about tbe true description of  the objects in the model. 
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proposed relations within that universe. Of course, the decision on occurrence of type S  errors is not limited to an 
investigation of the validity of relationships alone. As a matter of fact, one should commit the same validity study 
for every object description as well. 
Figure 5: Fuzziness concerning the true expressions for relations 
Comparing the foundational with the anti-foundational attitude towards type  ~ errors, we state 
that for an  objectivist, deciding on the occurrence of a type  ~ error is  essentially an objective, 
straightforward task to perform (if one is in possession of the foundation in relation to which the 
validity of theories can be verified). Having knowledge about the single true conceptual universe 
and model, all that matters is that the proposed model fits its true equivalent within the system's 
universe that was retained for studying the phenomenon. For a relativist however, the decision is 
more complicated. Being confronted with a collection of possible true universes and models, he 
should verifY  the  support of the  proposed model  within this  entire collection. If  there  exists 
support in at least one universe, the model is (more or less) valid in at least one view of  the world. 
However, if  there exists a universe for which there is  no support at all for the proposed model, a 
type  ~ error occurs (within the context of that universe). Notice that, for a given model that does 
not contain any type ~ error, modifYing a single component description may result in a series of 
type  ~ errors  depending  on the  validity  of models  in the  collection of possible conceptual 
universes. 
5.2.3.  Type r error 
Where a model builder can commit errors with respect to the set of retained system components 
and component descriptions, it is  only natural to extend the error concept to the state space as 
well. We state an error of type r occurs if one  has essentially come up with a state space for  a 
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component (object or relation)  that does  not have  any  support  in  at  least  one  space  of the 
collection of  true state spaces. Formally: 
Definition 23:  (A type r  error) 
In proposing a state space  f x  to describe a particular component X  we state an error of  type r 
occurs.:=> 3 f x'  tL?  (f  x) > 0: f x  <z f x' 
'x 
In other words, a type r error occurs if a description of a component is defined on a domain for 
which there is no support in at least one member of the set of all valid domains. For relations, this 
means one may have included a non-driving factor in a multivariate relationship28  or one may 
have erroneously retained the mathematical expression for the relationship as a state variable. For 
objects, type r  errors indicate one has  extended the state space with one or more variables that 
essentially do not constitute state variables29•  Analogue to the  theory of complex numbers,  we 
claim that the modelled reality component consists both of a real part and an imaginary part. Any 
fine positioning of one's conceptual model along the universe of the perceived component can be 
decomposed into a real and an imaginary part. The degree of realism of the retained component is 
nothing else than the  amount of curvature that occurred from  the true component towards the 
imaginary universe. In  other words, picturing the  conceptual universe of the analyst in a true 
conceptual universe for which there exists no support for the retained state space, leaves us with a 
non-orthogonality. Let us  illustrate the occurrence of type r  errors  using an  extension of our 
small factory example. 
Example 6: A foundational illustration of  a type r  error 
Let's extend once again our factory example and suppose in addition there is a repair worker (R) who inspects 
articles coming from server  I, repairs them if necessary and sends them to server 2. Furthermore, let's assume the 
working rate of server  I  is  directly determined by two causal factors.  First,  as  soon as  the error rate of goods 
produced by server 1 surpasses a critical level, the  server's speed is reduced.  Second, the activation of the repair 
28  Suppose that in a queuing system the analyst has determined that not only the length of the queue but also the number of  sunshine 
hours during the morning influences the service rate of  the single active server. If  however in reality, the number of  sunshine hours has 
nothing to do with the service rate, the analyst has come up with a non-driving factor in the dependency of  service rate. 
"  In the same queuing system, the length of  the single queue is some complex result of a collection of  state variables of  the system. 
Queue length is thus not a state variable and retaining it as such would involve a conceptual error. Similarly, in an earlier example on 
network traffic, the relation between network traffic and server activation had no state variable. Retaining the functional form between 
traffic and activation as a state variable would involve once again a conceptual error. 
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worker will slightly increase the server's speed since in the case of errors, the repair worker (instead of the server 
itself) will handle the production fault.  Figure 6 contains a visual overview of  the reality components and relations 
that comprise our small factory system. 
Figure 6: Couceptual model of  a small manufacturing system 
For clarification, we indicated the number of causal  factors (lor II) that define the domain of each relationship in 
reality. In summary, the following causal relationships are thus present among the system components queue (Q), 
repair worker (R), server I and 2 (Sl, S2) and the operator (0): 
the working rate of SI is adjusted (Sloo)  in function of the activation of R (Ra) and a 
condition variable X of  S I (S I,) 
S2 is activated (S2.) as soon as a condition variable of  the operator becomes true (0,) 
activation ofS2 (S2a) automatically leads to a decrease of  the working rate ofSI (Sloo) 
queue length at S 1 (QJ triggers the activation of S2 (S2.) 
Now, since the speed of server 1 will, unavoidably, be related to the queue length, it is not unthinkable a model 
builder would infer an additional causal factor (queue length) in the relation  PRa S1, ""Sl oo  and come up with a causal 
dependency P Q  R  Sl  .... Sl  that is defined on the domain Q, x  R. x Sl  •. Since the function space  iO ..  - ., where  A  a  X  w  ,.  -)u 
<ii  '" Q, x  R. x S 1"  is essentially an imaginary extension of the true function space  10 ...... ", «l>  '" R. x  S 1"  there 
exists no real image of any relation defined in  iO ii> .... " . (Attempting to project elements of iO ii> .... "  into  10 ...... " 
results in a degeneration.) However, we might create a complex extension of functions defined on «l>  by taking the 
inverse projection of any function in  10 ...... "  towards  iO ii> .... " . Hence, the collection of all extended functions forms 
a  subset of iO ii> .... ". Similar to  the theory of complex numbers, we state that the class of "complex" functions 
iOii> .... "  are the result of a confounding between an imaginary part  iO(ii>I")->"  and a real part  10 ...... ". To use the 
geometric terminology, functions that have a non-nill complex part are rotated at some non-zero angle with respect 
to their real part. The amount of rotation indicates the amount of complex presence and confounding that has 
occurred. 
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Figure 7: (Left) Causal relationship domains (Right) Real, complex and imaginary causal relation 
Notice that in the figure above, we did not draw the concrete perceived, true and imaginary relations but instead the 
templates (tbe dimensions) of which these concrete relationships could be called an instantation. Notice also tbat 
tbe angle between perceived and imaginary relationship (e2)  determines the amount of influence from tbe included 
causal factor. The smaller the angle, tbe more powerful is tbe influence of  the additional causal factor and the more 
"leakage" wiil occur from the imaginary influence towards the perceived influence. In other words, the smailer the 
angle, the more a level of rational  confounding will  have  occurred. It should be  clear from  the  figure that the 
perceived conceptual universe  3s  is non orthogonal in 3s. The amount of non-orthogonality (space curvature) 
indicates the amount of leakage that has occurred from non-existing, but included causal influences to  perceived 
relationships. Of course, in practice, leakage can occur towards many relationships and it is likely the space will be 
curved in many directions. 
6.  Structural validity revisited 
In the advance of our argument,  we  defined a topological resemblance of the philosophical 
scholarships  of objectivism  and  relativism  in  the  context of modelling  and  validation.  We 
considered models as points in a conceptual space and introduced a metric approach to validation. 
We indicated the yardstick for measuring validity is determined by ones philosophical adherence 
and discussed the repercussion on validity of several types of modelling errors that might occur 
for both objectivists and relativists. At this moment, an engaging obstacle remains how we  can 
finally express the structural validity of a proposed model/universe pair ( ~s,  Ss)? 
6.1.  Foundational structural validity 
Remember that for  a foundationalist,  modelling  errors  come  down  to  a  complexity (8) or 
curvature (r) of  the conceptual universe or a displacement  (~) of the conceptual model. How do 
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we measure the distance then between a proposed model  ~s that might have been inflicted with 
any of  those error types and the true model  ~? First, we should attempt to make the projection of 
~ onto the retained system (S) universe 3s. If  however 3s is not a subspace of S, the attempt to 
project  ~ onto  3s  results in  a degeneration.  Within the system universe  3s  retained, there 
simply does not exist a unique image of the true model of reality  ~. As a matter of fact, it is the 
conceptual space 3s that is in fact invalid. In a foundational context, a complex conceptual space 
automatically induces the invalidity of any model defined in that space. Besides the complexity of 
3s, the space may also be curved. Similarly,  ~ cannot be uniquely projected on the curved space 
3s. Indeed, the position of  ~ regarding the  included,  non-existing state variables  or causal 
factors  remains  inconclusive.  Therefore,  in  a  foundational  context,  curvature  of a  proposed 
conceptual space automatically induces invalidity of any residing model. Second, if the attempt to 
project  ~ on  3s does not fail,  it remains to be seen whether the proposed model coincides with 
our  projection.  Only  if the  model  and  the  projection are  identical,  the  model/universe pair 
(~s, 3s) is called structurally valid. Formally: 
Definition 24:  (Foundational structural validity) 
The structural validity of  a proposed model  ~s, that resides in a conceptual system universe  E s' is 
given by the truth value of  the expression: 
Ese :5,  E s is.l  and o( p  ->;;  (~), ~s) =  0,  with 0 the trivial metric.  -, 
Notice that the  formal  definition of objective,  foundational  structural  validity  involves  a 
satisfaction of a triplet of validity conditions. The retained system universe must be an orthogonal 
subspace of  the true conceptual universe of reality (the foundation) and the distance, measured by 
means of  the trivial metric, between proposed model and projected truth on the retained universe 
must equal the value zero. If any of these conditions is violated, the proposed model/universe pair 
(~s, 3s) is called invalid. If all conditions are satisfied, the truth-value of the expression equals 1 
and the model is believed to be  structurally valid. The alternative scenario is  that one or more 
conditions are violated which invokes a truth-value of  0, or a verdict of  structural invalidity. 
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6.2.  Anti-foundational structural validity 
For an anti-foundationalist, modelling errors carne down to a complexity (3) or curvature (0 of 
the retained conceptual universe, or a displacement  (~) of proposed conceptual model in at least 
one possible conceptual universe.  How  do  we  express now the validity of the same proposed 
model/universe pair (~s, 8s) in a relative, anti-foundational context? As a matter of  fact, the true 
foundation ( 8) becomes a fuzzy set  S"  of true conceptual universes (§). The structural validity 
of a model  is  then defined  in regard to  each  of those  conceptual  universes  for  which their 
membership value to the set  s,,'  /l~3 (8), is  strictly higher than null. Notice that the contours of 
the fuzzy set S" (the expression for the membership function  /l~3) are context dependent and are 
tuned by an aggregate of different world views of the model stakeholders, by the particular goal 
of the modelling study,  by  the  operational environment, etc ...  So,  for  a particular conceptual 
universe  §,  /l~3 (§) > 0,  we  define the structural validity of a proposed model/universe pair 
(~s, 8s) formally as follows: 
Definition 25:  (Anti-foundational structural validity) 
The  structural validity of  a proposed model  ~s' that resides in a conceptual system universe  5  s' 
with respect to  a conceptual universe  B,  Jl"<. ( 5) >  0,  is given by If with a fuzzy truth value 
determined by the expression: 
5s  C  5, 5s is J. and  O(p...,~  (~),  ~s) ~ If, with oafuzzy trivial metric.  -, 
Notice the distinction between objective and relative, anti-foundational structural validity. The 
outcome of a relative validation study is non-binary, but a fuzzy validity indication on a zero-one 
scale. For every 5', O' E  [0,1], we evaluate, in addition to the orthogonal subspace conditions, the 
degree  to  which the  distance  between  proposed  model  and  projected truth  equals  0'.  The 
structural validity of a model is  then believed to  be o·  with a truth-value of the expression as 
given in the above definition. So, in contrast to objectivism, there is now a continuum of validity 
states a model can take on. The binary zer%ne distance concept is extended to the entire unit 
interval [0,1]. Further, instead of attaining a crisp, objective outcome of a validation study, the 
structural validity  is  believed to be a fuzzy  number on the unit interval.  There  exists now a 
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continuum of structural  validity  expressions3o  that  are  evaluated  by  the  satisfaction  of the 
condition of an orthogonal subspace and the membership value to the calculated fuzzy distance. 
7.  Conclusion and future research 
In this paper,  we  reflected on the issue of model  validity in the context of simulation. In an 
early  section,  we  discussed  different  kinds  of validation  and  explained  their relation  with 
verification and accreditation. For a more profound investigation into the issue of model validity, 
it seemed inescapable to have a look at the classic philosophical duality of objectivism versus 
relativism, which plays a central role in the validation of any  scientific theory. In an attempt to 
consolidate this polarity in our reasoning of validity, we formulated a topological interpretation of 
both a foundational and an  anti-foundational attitude towards structural validation. As we have 
demonstrated, in an objective context, there exists a unique triplet of conceptual universe, model 
and state spaces that constitutes the  foundation to  which the validity of proposed simulation 
models  can be  revealed.  In  this  objective  context,  we  derived  the  natural topology  on the 
conceptual universe is the discrete topology, induced by the trivial metric. The natural metrisation 
of the conceptual universe, together with the objective uniqueness of truth allowed us to define 
objective, structural validity as  the truth value of an expression, embodying the orthogonality of 
the retained system universe, its containment in the true universe of reality as well as the equality 
of the proposed model with projected truth. In a relativistic context however, we  indicated the 
foundation to validate models becomes relative, context dependent and related to the particular 
worldviews of the model stakeholders. The objective uniqueness of the true triplet of universe, 
model and state spaces, was questioned. In this relative context, we derived the natural topology 
on the conceptual universe is the fuzzy  discrete topology, induced by a fuzzy trivial metric. This 
metrisation of the  conceptual universe  allowed us  to  define  a fuzzy  set of valid models with 
respect to  a particular worldview.  We  defined relative, structural validity as  a fuzzy number on 
the unit interval, portraying a fuzzy perception concerning the validity of  the proposed model. 
By  approaching the matter of validation through the pathway  of a fuzzy  measure of model 
validity, a challenge for future research remains to come up with a technique that allows for such 
a fuzzy  appraisal of validity. Moreover,  we  restricted  our analysis to the matter of structural 
validation only. It is again an issue of additional investigation to examine the topological version 
30 These expressions take on the form "structural validity equals () with truth-value x". 
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of behaviour validity  and to study the relation between structural and behavioural validity. In 
summary, it seems most fruitful to direct future research towards the development of a practical 
technique that enables a fuzzified assessment of  both structural and behavioural validity. 
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